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When I was researching the idea of peace in Rwanda between 2006 and 2013 
(Martinon 2013), I stumbled upon an unexpected problem: how is one to interpret the 
Biblical Sixth Commandment (“Thou Shall Not Kill”) in a Rwandan context? The 
problem was not so much a historical one: for example, how did the Bible impose 
itself in Rwanda and how did the prohibition against murder became accepted by all 
Rwandese? The history of the arrival of the White Fathers in East Africa, for 
example, explain at least partially, this imposition of the Bible and of its prohibitions.1 
So this wasn’t the issue. The problem was not so much a socio-political and religious 
one either: for example, why did the prohibition against murder ended up being so 
ignored during the genocide? The infamous and controversial saying by a Rwandan 
Bishop after the end of the Genocide that Rwandese are more Catholics than they 
are Christians could explain to some degree this overwhelmingly thorny issue.2 So 
again, this wasn’t the issue either. The problem was really a philosophical one about 
the origins of ethics: on the one hand, there is a written Judeo-Christian prohibition 
against murder and on the other, there is a whole range of Rwandan prohibitions, 
passed on orally between generations, none of which specifically target the act of 
murder.3 
 
The problem was therefore more than just a question of historical, political, cultural, 
or religious heritage; the problem was eminently philosophical: on what should ethics 
be based: on what is written or what is transmitted orally? If we go for the former (the 
written), then we abide, as we will see, not only by the entire Abrahamic tradition, for 
which the Word is placed centre-staged in any discussion of ethics, but also by the 
                                                 
1 For one of the most remarkable accounts of the relationship between the White Fathers, the 
colonial regimes, and the kingdom of Rwanda, see Des Forges-Liebhafsky (2011). 
2 On this topic, see Longman (2011).  
3 On the oral tradition of Rwanda, see amongst others, Crepeau (1985) and Biruka (2010). 
entire history of Western ethics (or moral philosophy) from Kant’s categorical 
imperative (his unconditional maxim needs the rational written order to enter into 
force4) to all contemporary moral principles, whether in Normative or Applied Ethics: 
they all rely on the force of generality of written commandments, principles, rules, or 
maxims. If we go with the latter (the oral), then what ethical imperative against 
murder do oral societies, and Rwanda specifically, abide by? If, for example, 
someone says orally in Kinyarwanda, “Injunga y’urulimi inesha injunga z’igitero - The 
sharpness of the tongue defeats the sharpness of the warriors,”5 can it be enough to 
stop the blade? In other words, what is it exactly that enjoins the respect of the 
imperative not to kill, if it is not just the fear of being incarcerated by a legal system 
based on colonial and post-colonial written laws? 
 
In order to address this complex issue, I will first look briefly at the structure of the 
Sixth Commandment not in a religious or historical context, but a philosophical one. I 
will then explore the long-lived systems of prohibitions in Rwanda. The aim of this 
juxtaposition is not so much to question the strength or validity of either system 
(written or oral), but to highlight the problem we face when thinking the start of 
ethics, the point at which ethics needs to be taken in consideration. 
 
• The Judeo-Christian Sixth Commandment 
 
As is well known, the Biblical prohibition against murder6 constitutes in the Old 
Testament what has come to be seen as the first Word. As the Talmudic scholar, 
Marc-Alain Ouaknin, explains:  
 
“According to the Talmud, the disposition of Moses’s table aims to put in relation or 
correspondence each of the five commandments: five on each side. The sixth 
commandment thus corresponds to the first one, ‘I am the Lord, thy God…’  For 
this reason, commentators would say that ‘you shall not kill’ means ‘you shall not 
                                                 
4 On this topic, see Nancy (1983), and in English, Nancy (2003: 133-51). 
5 “Language is as dangerous as a weapon.” Crepeau and Bizimana (1979, No. 1602, 239). All 
translations are mine unless otherwise stated. 
6 For a clear account of the problems associated with this Biblical commandment, see: Bailey 
(2005). 
kill the way in which your God revealed Himself and said ‘I am.’ The sixth 
commandment can thus be translated with: ‘You shall not kill the ‘I am’” (Ouaknin 
1999: 122).  
 
By linking the two Commandments at the top of Moses’s two-column table, it is clear 
that the Old Testament wanted to show that language is what needs to be given 
priority: the name of God (on the left) can be read, uttered, and repeated only when 
the possibility of death (on the right) has been set aside. In other words, there can be 
no Word without at the same time a prohibition against murder. The two columns are 
therefore strategically headed by the declaration of divine expression against the 
possibility of death.  
 
However, this is not all. What this heading also demonstrates is that the juxtaposition 
First and Sixth Commandments not only gives priority and importance to language, it 
also inaugurates the birth of Western subjectivity, both in its godly and human 
acceptations. On the one hand, there is a divine assertion: “I am the Lord, thy God.” 
On the other hand, there is also, through this divine statement and the adjoining 
suggestion not to kill, another subject: “I am (potentially murderous).” How is this so? 
Basically, the explicit positing of the sovereignty of the divine subject also suggests, 
through the opening provided by the Sixth Commandment, the implicit possibility of 
the mortal subject on the right. The two subjects are clearly announced at the top of 
Moses’s tables: one in its assertive statement, the other in its inferred potential. In 
this way, the Word is given to us splintered, God on the left, mortals on the right, the 
two clearly showing that the positing of the subject is overall explicitly always divine, 
but it is also implicitly potentially murderous. The Western subject appears here as if 
an unmentionable corollary statement of fact that can never be reconciled: divine, 
but also potentially evil.  
 
The intertwinement between the birth of God, the subject, and language has never 
been better exposed than in the metonymy of the face put forward by the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas who says, for example: “This infinity, stronger than 
murder, already resists us in his face, is his face, is the primordial expression, is the 
first word: ‘you shall not commit murder’” (Levinas 1969: 198-9). With this complex 
sentence, Levinas, intertwines, following the Old Testament, the infinity of God with 
human finitude and inscribes the Commandment right at the heart of the very 
constitution of subjectivity. Let’s unpack Levinas’s statement. Before being a subject, 
“I am” is indeed a face. However, because this face breaks open the possibility of the 
new and thereby introduces the radically Other or God, “it” is also “I am the Lord.” 
The two cannot be distinguished with much clarity. The face introduces God as he or 
she pronounces His word. But the interface “I am” / “I am the Lord” cannot take place 
without a prohibition splintering the two. It is, as we have seen, what guarantees its 
taking place. Finitude and infinity thus clash right in the metonymy of the face, with 
infinity always on the strong side, and finitude always prone to murder. In this way, 
subjectivity, God, and language come together and in order to take place, they each 
need to thwart the very possibility of death itself.  
 
The curious thing about this link between the First and Sixth Commandments is the 
fact that although it inaugurates God, the subject, and language, it also raises the 
question of exception: what are the circumstances in which either subject (God or 
mortals) is permitted to kill, who can really avoid the Commandment and get away 
with murder. This is what the futural modal verb (“Shall”) implies: the Commandment 
can be broken. As Jean-François Lyotard, this assiduous reader of Levinas has 
shown, “Thou Shall Not Kill” does not call for peace, it raises instead the question of 
exception. As he says: “The prescription ‘thou shalt not kill’ has always been 
festooned with exceptions, and all these exceptions have implied ‘thou shalt kill’” 
(Lyotard 1985, 63). The question, of course, is then this: What circumstances permit 
killing or murder? To look for these exceptions in the Bible (and they are many!) 
would be pointless, because these don’t address the issue raised by Moses’s 
unexplained and unjustified futural suggestion that killing is “not a good idea.” 
Juxtaposed with the positing of divine sovereignty, the tacit exceptions implied posit 
in fact the issue of freedom: both divine and mortal subjects are free to determine 
these exceptions. This freedom is not a state, but the setting-off of the sovereign 
subjects (divine and mortal) in their search for morality. In this way, the headings of 
Moses’ tables inaugurate the freedom of both subjects to ethical self-determination. 
 
Ultimately, these two arguments by Levinas and Lyotard help us to see that the 
Biblical pairing “I am” / “Thou Shall Not Kill” can never be paradoxically above the 
law; it is, on the contrary, the start of all laws, of all moral statements, and of all 
ethical decisions as to what is good or bad. In other words, the first two lines on 
Moses’s table give us not a law on how to live righteously (obeying God and not 
murdering anyone, for example), but how the law should start: it should start with the 
realisation that we are always already in a free state of deliberation: “I am” / “Thou 
Shall Not Kill,” a deliberation that authorizes, as Jacques Derrida says in his own 
oblique reading of the Commandment, “every ethical law in general” (Derrida 2001: 
99). In this way, because they are written, Moses’s tables are therefore not moral 
instructions, they are an offering to debate. That’s their point. They demand that we, 
as sovereign subjects, ponder the meaning written on these tablets of stones; reflect 
not only on who we are, but also on how we relate to this divine being who 
announces Himself and what happens if we abandon Him and kill (ourselves or) 
another. In sum, the first two lines of the tables don’t put forward a set of principles to 
follow, they concretize the necessity of ethical reflection, which is nothing other than 
the concretization of the freedom of the sovereign subject. 
 
As all this hopefully shows, the two short enigmatic sentences forming the heading of 
Moses’s tables rest on the power of the written word. It is from this writing and this 
formal typesetting that the necessity of ethics emerges. There is no getting out of 
this. These simple words not only determine the other commandments in the rest of 
the tables, they also inaugurate every written codes and laws in most countries in the 
world, including both those who do not have formal constitutions and those who have 
sternly divorced themselves from any religion. Both the subject in all its sovereignty 
and the imperative to refrain from killing are the cornerstone of every modern nation 
on earth and this even if they don’t strictly abide by them. Now the question is 
inevitably this: What happens when the written is secondary to the oral relations? 
What happens to this written Biblical call for interpretation in a country, like Rwanda,7 
that has only passed from an oral tradition to a written one in the last one hundred 
                                                 
7 I leave aside here, for lack of time, an important analysis with regards to the juxtaposition 
between monotheism (and its written commandments) and Rwanda’s multivalent 
apperception of God under the name Imana. If this were a book, it would then be necessary to 
analyse the conflation divine/mortal subjectivity, language, and prohibition against murder 
and to contrast it with a non-monotheistic society and culture. As I said, my aim here is not 
theological or historical, but ethical, however much it is difficult to distinguish the two 
properly speaking. 
and fifty years? In order to address these questions, let me first explore briefly the 




Rwanda once had a whole set of oral prohibitions, called (umuziro, plural imiziro), 
that regulated the lives of particular groups of people and specific individuals. The 
imiziro were indeed imposed onto specifically targeted groups, like women,9 hunters, 
landowners, etc. and to particular individuals, such as the king, court clerks, heads of 
clans, etc.10 Although the population largely ignores them today, anthropologists 
continue to highlight the fact that many Rwandese still rely on them even in a 
globalised modern and secular environment. As the anthropologist Danielle de 
Lame, for example, remarks with regards to the space of the Rwandan home 
(urugo): 
 
“Even if space as defined culturally by the imiziro ritual prescriptions and 
prohibitions has been largely rejected, related beliefs continue to suffuse the 
everyday life of Rwandese… very few are indifferent to them.”11 
 
In this way, although it is no longer possible to generalise today about Rwandan 
prohibitions or explain them within the context of a complex and long-established 
animist system,12 it is therefore clearly a fact that “in some cases these may still 
swing the register of meaning for many Rwandese from reality to efficient 
                                                 
8 “It is forbidden!” Alexis Kagame uses this expression in this context: “If you ask a 
Rwandan: ‘Can you marry your sister?’ He will reply: ntibishóböka, kirazira! = ‘This is not 
feasible: it’s forbidden!’” Kagame (1956: 381). 
9 “Women were subjected to more ritual rules (imiziro) than men. This is because their 
human condition, evidenced in speech, just barely conceded to them (now as before), 
transgressed their culturally assigned role as vehicle.” de Lame (2005: 439). 
10 See de Lame (2004: 288-9). 
11 de Lame (2005: 86), translation modified. See also de Lame (2004: 288). 
12 For such an analysis, see Gasarabwe (1978) and Gasarabwe (1993): 31-33. 
symbolism.”13 How are we then to understand the need to evade murder in this 
complex system of oral prohibitions14? 
 
What transpires from all the literature on Rwandan prohibitions15 is that there 
appears to be no specific prohibition against murder.16 In other words, the idea of a 
Biblical Sixth Commandment appears to be inconceivable not because murder is 
allowed or because Rwandese have little regard for life, but for two specific reasons: 
 
The first reason is simply that it is not possible to conceive in Kinyarwanda 
something so generic, general, or primary and then apply it to all. The Rwandan 
language and culture simply does not permit it.17 Outside of a Judeo-Christian 
context—if this were at all possible today in Rwanda—a prohibition against murder 
would be hinted at within the context of specific prohibitions such as those defining 
relationships between individuals or groups of individuals.18 In the past, for example, 
Rwandese could take women or children hostage, but not kill them; in another 
context, they could kill a man, but not when entering someone’s home, where, 
crucially, hospitality would supersede mortal disputes. When building a new house, 
the oral tradition called upon the new home-owner to bury the rope that served to 
delimit the boundary with a fruit (umutanga) in order to ward off all possible ills that 
might befall it (theft, murder, arson, etc.).19 As these examples show, the lack of 
specificity prevents anyone from formulating a commandment as a generic form of 
moral imperative applicable not only in all situations, but also to all subjects 
understood irrespective of their gender, clan, or their socio-economic or professional 
standing. The first reason there is no single Rwandan prohibition or saying that 
                                                 
13 de Lame (2005: 34), translation modified. 
14 I am obviously aware that Rwanda is a predominantly Christian country (as of 2012, 
Catholics represented 43.7%, Protestants 37.7%—of whom 11.8 % were Seventh Day 
Adventists—Muslims 2%, while 1.3% claimed no religious beliefs). The idea is only 
intended to challenge the logic of the Commandment’s articulating principle. 
15 For such a literature, see amongst others, Bigirumwami (1983), Bigirumwami (1987), and 
Kagame (1954). 
16 This was confirmed to me in an exchanged of emails with Charles Ntampaka, lawyer and 
expert in Rwandan law and society. I thank him once more for his help. 
17 On this, see Balibusta (2000b: 181). 
18 For a more comprehensive list of prohibitions, see amongst others, Pages (1933: 407-414), 
Sandrart (1951), Bourgeois (1954-1958), and Nothomb (1965: 195-200). 
19 On this rite, called “kutanga umulozi nu mwanzi,” see Nothomb (1965: 116). 
directly tackles the problem of murder is therefore that the multiplicity of contexts in 
which the death of someone might occur simply does not permit it. There are 
effectively far too many exceptions or contexts for anything so generic, thus 
invalidating any legitimacy to the prohibition, even if it is conceived as hypothetically 
to-come (“Shall”).   
 
Secondly, because in Rwanda, a prohibition against murder could not focus on the 
sole responsibility of a sinful individual,20 but on the responsibility of the group or 
collectivity.21 As many anthropologists have noted, the idea of “sin” and therefore of 
an individual’s transgression against a divine law did not exist prior to the arrival of 
White Fathers in East Africa. In this way, unlike the Sixth Commandment, which 
focuses on targeting both the guilt and responsibility of the one person who 
transgresses it,22 Rwandan prohibitions against murder involve everyone concerned, 
that is, everyone in the family (Imilyango), clan (Ubwoko), or lineage (Umuryango)23 
in which a murder has taken place. This is evidenced in the way crimes are 
understood, even in some cases, to this day: if one person commits a crime, all 
members of the particular lineage or group feel obliged to take on the responsibility 
for the crime. A parricide, for example, is a crime that calls for the entire family of the 
perpetrator to follow specific rituals of purification.24 The consequence of this is that 
the feeling of belonging to a lineage or group necessarily lessens the answerability 
or responsibility of the one individual vis-à-vis the crime itself.25 In this context, a 
generic prohibition applicable to all would then be, once again, unnecessary. 
 
                                                 
20 The common Biblical use of the singular pronoun “thou” instead of the plural “ye” attest 
quite simply to this singularity. 
21 “In the non-Christian Central African thought, the idea of sin in a Christian sense does not 
exist.” Nothomb (1965: 105). Nothomb also quotes Aloysius Bigirumwami who, in Imihango 
y’imigenzo n’iyi’imizilirizo (Diocese of Nyundo, 1964), confirms that non-Christian 
Rwandese could never have conceived of the idea of sin. Nothomb (1965: 105, fn. 52). 
22 For the way the Sixth Commandment has progressively become a prohibition against 
individual murder and not killing in general, see Bailey (2005). 
23 For pre-colonial Rwanda, see Kagame (1954: 77-80) and Maquet (1954). 
24 As Nothomb remarks, corroborating Kagame’s earlier analysis: “If a member of a family 
[or clan] killed someone not belonging to this family [or clan], every male member of the 
family would feel collectively responsible for this murder.” Nothomb (1965): 170. 
25 This should obviously not be seen to explain the Rwandan genocide. Any reductive view 
of this nature can only distort the tragedy that occurred in 1994. For the way this consequence 
is drawn, see Nothomb (1965: 173). 
So if I take on board these two specific reasons, the issue then becomes a little more 
complex especially if we include prohibitions not only against murder specifically, but 
also prohibitions aimed at protecting life as well, for example, those imposed on 
pregnant women and their husbands.26 One way to clarify the issue is perhaps to 
look at the crucial temporal dimension of these Rwandan prohibitions. For 
Rwandese, an umuziro is something that either falls down upon its unexpected 
victim or remains as a daily hindrance or inconvenience.27 As Pierre Smith says:  
 
“When one asks Rwandese why one should try to avoid transgressing imiziro, … 
they usually give two types of answers, one that refers to the past and the other to 
the future: ‘because we inherited from our fathers,’ or ‘because it is bound to bring 
misfortune’” (Smith 1979: 18). 
 
The hesitation between inheritance and the provocation of an unhappy future 
highlights the pivotal temporal dimension of the prohibition: imiziro are there to 
ensure that the present takes place unencumbered by the vicissitudes imposed or 
inflicted by times not belonging to it: a past which might not even be remembered or 
a future which even prediction or projection might not necessarily clarify. In other 
words, imiziro consolidates the present by rendering it free of any (known or 
unknown) inheritance or expectation.  
 
This explains the Rwandan philosopher Alexis Kagame’s startling and seemingly 
paradoxical claim that one can transgress an umuziro without awareness. They fall 
upon the Rwandese, even if he or she is not aware of them. As he writes: 
 
“The one who transgresses a prohibition exposes him or herself to be punished. 
However, this punishment can take place immediately after the prohibition is 
transgressed or long after. This uncertainty means that the person at fault does 
not necessarily realise his or her crime: one can transgress a prohibition without 
knowing it. This means that the prohibition does not necessarily imply knowledge 
or free-will” (Kagame 1956 : 384). 
                                                 
26 Example given to me by Charles Ntampaka. 
27 On this, see Dufays and de Moor (1938). On this state of fear, see de Lame (1997: 157-
177). 
 The issue here is not one of consciousness versus unconsciousness28 or that in any 
given situation a prohibition can potentially be transgressed. The issue is simply that 
prohibitions take place irrespective of the subject, that is, irrespective of the “I am.” 
They concern the family, clan, or lineage understood as what precisely stretches 
itself out in time over and beyond the everyday of the individual affected. Imiziro thus 
regulate a social present thick with an immemorial past and an unknowable future 
that no single Rwandese could possibly fathom in their entirety, let alone regulate 
with a blanket truism applicable to all.  
 
The outcome of Rwandan prohibitions is therefore not the potential culpability of 
someone who might transgress a generic law (the “shall” of the Sixth 
Commandment), but the intermittent state of worry that the family, clan, or lineage 
undergoes. The worry is indeed that any one of its members accidentally 
transgresses a prohibition or an observance (kwandagaza). This general state of 
worry can never be overcome precisely because of the a-temporal nature of the 
social-present involved: ancestors and descendants who might still also be involved 
in forcing the living in abiding to prohibitions. This explains the famous Rwandan 
proverb: “Kuba I Rwanda ni ukwizirira – To be in Rwanda is to intermittently evade 
what is prohibited.”29 This proverb effectively means that to be a Rwandese 
represents an irregular state of responsibility to the family, clan, or lineage on the 
basis of pre-existing prohibitions that are for a large part forgotten or unknown and 
that can suddenly fall down as if from out of time. Individual sin is here replaced by 
the group’s general sense of worry that only a common effort of mutual support can 
attenuate. 
 
There is one major consequence to the ghostly character of these Rwandan 
prohibitions: whether recognizable or not, whether directed against murder or not, 
imiziro have curiously and paradoxically nothing to do with law. As Kagame says: 
“They [Rwandan prohibitions] all have this in common: they never concern law. They 
only fall upon those who are concerned by them. In this way, they enjoin no positive 
                                                 
28 On this, see Balibusta (1985: 152) and Balibusta (2000a: 100). 
29 “Être au Rwanda, c’est éviter ponctuellement ce qui n’est pas permis.” Kagame (1956: 
393). Also quoted in Nothomb (1965: 196). 
outcome” (Kagame 1956: 383). In other words, an umuziro is effectively what cannot 
enter into any form of economy. Nothing can be gained from adhering to them. If the 
respect of the Sixth Commandment guarantees a life free of prison sentences, then 
the respect of an umuziro guarantees nothing. Why? Simply because the respect of 
the prohibition might have consequences beyond the single life of the one who takes 
it on. So adhering to a prohibition does not necessarily guarantee a return in this life 
or another. The “otherworldly” dimensions (past or future) of the umuziro indeed also 
prevent it from being negotiated in the context of a religious structure of belief: the 
one who follows a prohibition, for example, can never be promised paradise. Unlike 
the Abrahamic Commandment, there is here therefore no pay off. In this way, an 
umiziro expresses the necessity of rule in a situation in which there are no written 
laws and therefore no guarantees. 
 
If one then takes on board the temporal dimension of these oral Rwandan 
prohibitions with their extraordinary reliance on the family, clan, or lineage, and the 
possible involvement of long-dead ancestors and future off-springs, then how is one 
to make sense again of our old First and Sixth Commandments and the way they still 
articulate the absolute responsibility of the individual (sinful) subject? Can one affect 
the other and if yes, how? And ultimately, what can be learned, through this 
comparison, about the birth of language and that of the law? 
 
Let’s first look at the impact of these Rwandan prohibitions on what we have 
inherited from a Judeo-Christian context. The force of generality of the Biblical 
Commandments, one that inaugurates the sovereignty of both God and human 
subjectivity and introduces written language as the start of law is here severely 
shaken at its core and this for three fundamental reasons. Firstly, the force of 
generality that imposes itself on the individual sinner suddenly no longer makes 
sense because the group (family, clan, or lineage) takes over from the individual. 
This does not lessen the responsibility (and the guilt) of the one committing a crime 
and thereby transgressing a prohibition. This simply extends across generations the 
transgression, making it a concern for all living relatives. Secondly, the sin that is 
targeted in the Sixth Commandment is here replaced by accident. To transgress a 
prohibition is indeed not a criminal offence, but a woeful distortion of the fabric of the 
social present: the family, clan, or lineage. Again, this does not mean Rwandese are 
freer than their pious religious counterparts. This simply means that accidents 
happen, some more unfortunate than others, and no one should shoulder the burden 
of it on their own. Finally, the economic aspect of the Biblical command is here 
replaced by an intermittent—albeit necessarily nebulous—relationships with 
ancestors or descendants. This is what the prohibitions ultimately highlight: 
Rwandese never operate alone; they go through the imiziro as part of an a-temporal 
structure that effectively over-rules them.  
 
Obviously, the aim behind the juxtaposition of Biblical Commandment with Rwandan 
prohibitions is not to privilege a now often-forgotten oral system over a now sadly 
often-ignored written Biblical text or vice-versa. Rwandese themselves wouldn’t want 
to do so either, not because they are less ruled by animist beliefs or because they 
are less Christian than they used to be, but because the two take place every day 
without anyone really noticing which tradition is being followed. A Benedictine nun 
living in the Monastère Notre-Dame de l'Annonciation Sovu, near Butare, for 
example, once told me that she rules her life following both the strict edicts of the 
Bible and occasionally the long-held beliefs and rules of her family and clan. 
Similarly, an atheist worldly Rwandese living in the pristine capital city of Rwanda 
might also easily understand the importance of observing certain moral imperatives 
without necessarily attributing an origin to these in either one or other system of 
belief; he or she will simply have inherited them as self-evident. In this way, whether 
inherited from ancestors or the White Fathers, prohibitions “happen,” their force of 
generality being applicable often irrespective of their written or oral origins. In this 
way, the laxity in heeding either moral system to “the letter” renders pointless any 
attempt at distinguish the two or creating a hierarchy between them. 
 
This juxtaposition aims instead to question what is generally perceived as self-
evident: i.e. that the start of ethics can only be found in the intertwinement of a 
generic responsible singular subject and of a written commandment, principle, or 
maxim that can be read, uttered, and repeated. In other words, looking at Rwandan 
prohibitions allows us to question the very foundations of ethics in general, their 
supposed dependence on the written and their reliance on often forgotten religious 
commandments. The orality of Rwandan prohibitions, their many contexts, the 
general un-answerability of the individual, the extension of the problem throughout 
the family, clan, or lineage, and beyond those, towards what can never be 
remembered or anticipated, shake the concreteness of Moses’s tables and their 
invitation to deliberation as well as the supposed goodness of always trumping the 
possibility of murder with an “I am the Lord, thy God.” What prohibition is indeed 
transgressed if it is not just futural, but also multiple and ancestral? Who is really 
responsible when a crime is committed? Who should endorse the responsibility of a 
crime if the “I am” is socially set aside? These are questions that neither philosophy 
nor ethics understood in a Western context can possibly answer if it doesn’t take 
seriously what Rwandan prohibitions with their source in the oral tradition leave us. 
 
This juxtaposition also aims at questioning yet another meta-narrative of Abrahamic 
origin unnecessarily blanketing the world. Looking at intermittently-used oral 
prohibitions in Rwanda, thinking about the role of ancestors and descendants in the 
attribution of responsibility or guilt amidst a family, clan, or lineage, and considering 
what does not belong to the social present when a prohibition enters into force, allow 
overall to question the supposed universality of a fundamentally problematic—if not 
dangerous—monotheistic system that privileges criminal individuals, their necessary 
guilt, and inevitably, their eventual redemption in a penitentiary system provided by 
the community or in a world beyond. The juxtaposition thus forces a different kind of 
reflection that focuses on the origin of ethics: not where do ethics come from or how 
it comes to us, but who actually utters moral imperatives and who is ready to hear 
them? This simple shift from “where” to “who” that only an oral tradition can provoke 
shows that ethics effectively cannot exclusively originate in a written law and it 
cannot concern the individual as if a sovereign subject; it concerns the social 
present, as it occurs amongst groups of people and those who are no longer there or 
are yet to come. It is amongst them that ethical commandments and moral 
imperatives are provoked into being or made to “happen,” something which is difficult 
to reconcile with the economies provided in writing by monotheistic religions and 
their secular avatars. 
 
Finally, by juxtaposing First and Sixth Commandments with Rwandan Prohibitions, 
the aim is also to finally make sense of the conundrum left behind by the Rwandan 
genocide: who is indeed responsible in a situation in which there is no single 
individual ultimately responsible for the crimes committed (a Hitler or a Stalin, for 
example), but a whole nation committing, voluntarily or not, acts of genocide? This is 
probably the most difficult and problematic aspect of the Rwandan Genocide: it 
knows no designated culprit; it identifies no single sinner; it recognizes no “evil” 
person. This is especially the case now that the distinctions Hutus/Tutsi is forbidden 
and a new unifying a-historical citizenship homogenizes the population under one 
name: the Rwandese, not as a family, clan, or lineage, but as a uniform appellation 
(“I am Rwandese…”) belonging at once to no one and everyone. Cast in such a 
generic mould, the fault, guilt, and responsibility for the genocide is thus inevitably 
transposed onto the “other” and especially the foreigner for having imposed the 
ethnic distinction in the first place (Belgian ethnographers), for intervening at the last 
minute disastrously (operation Turquoise), and for refusing to help (Clinton and the 
UN) during one of the most terrifying moments in the history of humanity. 
Notwithstanding this un-resolvable conundrum, we therefore have much to learn 
from the old Rwandan prohibitions. They invite us to think ethics beyond the 
burdensome confines of the birth of subjectivity, language, and the monotheism of “I 
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